Manufacturing played an important part in sustaining India's economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. The economic reforms of the early 1990s did not lead to sustained growth of the manufacturing sector. After an acceleration in the mid-1990s, growth slowed in the decade's second half. The analysis presented in this paper reveals that manufacturing-sector growth in the postreform period is "input driven" rather than "efficiency driven, " with significant levels of technical inefficiency. The paper advocates policies to improve production efficiency by encouraging investment in research and development, technical training for workers, and technology-aided managerial processes.
The setting: Growth and competitiveness of India's manufacturing sector
India's nonagricultural sectors produced 75 percent of the overall output of the country's economy in [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Of these nonagricultural sectors, manufacturing accounted for 23 percent of total GDP; the electricity, water supply and gas, mining, and construction subsectors accounted for 9 percent; and the service sector, comprising all other subsectors, accounted for the remaining 43 percent. Thus, manufacturing, when considered a single group of activities, is a major sector in the Indian economy.
The Indian manufacturing sector entered into a slower pace of growth beginning in 1980, but particularly in the post-1991 reform period. Considerable controversy exists among researchers about the causes of this slowdown. 1 The sustained growth of this sector is now under threat, primarily because it has been unable to compete effectively in the new environment created by trade liberalization policies. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) report of 2002 indicates that India's competitiveness did not improve signiªcantly between 1985 and 1998, whereas the competitiveness of China's industrial sector, as measured by the competitive industrial performance (CIP) index, improved sharply during this time (table 1a) . Given the importance of the structure and characteristics of manufactured exports to the calculation of the CIP index, it is worthwhile to examine and compare the manufactured exports of three large labor-abundant economies: India, China, and Indonesia. Table 1b shows the percentage composition of these three countries' incremental extended manufacturing exports between four pre-reform years and four post-reform years for each of ªve broad categories of exports: resourceintensive (mainly processed agricultural and mineral products), labor-intensive (light manufactures), scale-intensive (such as chemicals other than drugs), differentiated (mostly machinery and transport equipment), and science-intensive (high-tech products). Traditional labor-intensive and scale-intensive exports together accounted for nearly 80 percent of India's incremental exports. In contrast, differentiated products have increasingly been taking a larger share (54 percent) of the incremental composition of the world's manufactured exports. China and Indonesia have been penetrating this expanding market, but India has not.
Within a short period China has consolidated its position as one of the leading manufacturing locations, so why has India not been able to do so? One of the major determinants of a country's international competitiveness is its productivity relative to that of competing countries and trading partners. Of foremost importance to the improvement of productivity, however, is the ability to operate on the production frontier, that is, the ability of ªrms to achieve their maximum possible output from a given set of inputs and technology. When a country operates not on but inside its production frontier, then it is possible to increase output without having to increase 1 Notable earlier controversies center on the work of Ahluwalia (1985 Ahluwalia ( , 1991 , Goldar (1986) , and Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (1994) on the productivity of the Indian manufacturing sector. Krishna (1987) examines and explains the differences in the results of Ahluwalia (1985) and Goldar (1986) . Using data from the pre-reform period, Ahluwalia's 1991 study documents the poor total factor productivity growth in Indian manufacturing up to the end of the 1970s but claims there was a turnaround and a rising trend in total factor productivity during the ªrst half of the 1980s. Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (1994) provide evidence against Ahluwalia's turnaround hypothesis. Source: Srinivasan (2001) .
In other words, manufacturing ªrms in India appear to be operating inside their production frontier. Using ªrm-level panel data, Balakrishnan, Pushpangadan, and Babu (2000) concluded that there has not been any signiªcant improvement in productivity growth in Indian manufacturing in the post-reform period, but they did not attempt to explain this result. If the reason for the decline or stagnation in productivity growth is a lack of competitiveness, then policies should address this issue. If the lack of competitiveness is attributable to the "policy environment," then the government should adjust its policies.
The objectives of this paper are to analyze the sources of output growth in the manufacturing sector of India in the post-reform period and to identify the crucial factors that inºuence manufacturing productivity. Our work attributes the poor growth performance of the Indian manufacturing sector in recent times to poor organization, inappropriate manufacturing strategies, and misguided decision making at the ªrm level.
Our analysis is based on the corporate database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The database provides detailed quantiªcation and diagnosis of the growth, proªtability, and liquidity of about 7,800 ªrms in the Indian corporate sector, which is disaggregated over several years by industry, ownership, size, and age. 2 PROWESS provides information on about 8,000 companies, covering public, private, cooperative, and joint-sector companies, listed or otherwise. These companies account for more than 70 percent of the economic activity in the organized industrial sector of India. PROWESS is thus the most comprehensive and current database of the Indian corporate
The 1991 turning point in Indian economic management
Some researchers argue that the political economy of industrialization in India has been a key determinant of the performance of the manufacturing sector. For example, Joshi and Little (1994, 3) claim that India's postindependence industrialization strategy was not only "micro-economically inefªcient, but macro-economically perverse." In India's central-planning era, the Mahalanobis (1955) model of development called for the public sector to be the prime mover of the economy through strong involvement in investment and employment generation. Investments in factories, mining, and power generation expanded greatly in the Second Plan (and thereafter); the mining and power sectors grew relative to the total economy; and within the industrial sector, there was a major shift away from consumer goods toward output of capital goods. Within the broad industrial sector, public activity was growing relative to private activity. By the Third Plan, the proportion of public investments in factories, power generation, and mining exceeded 70 percent. This strategy has been severely criticized for being highly inefªcient and for not using India's abundant labor resources (Bhagwati 1993) .
From the 1970s, the success of the East Asian growth model was increasingly acknowledged in the literature, and the model was being successfully followed in some Southeast Asian countries. This persuaded Indian policymakers to begin recasting India's development strategy. From 1977, and particularly after 1985-86, policy changes were initiated to move the economic policies toward liberalization and deregulation. Some important changes in trade and industrial policies were announced in broad terms in the documents of the Seventh Plan . Consequently, the GDP growth rate increased to 5.5 percent from the long-stagnant 3.5 percent. However, in the process of establishing and maintaining heavy industries, the government had accumulated large deªcits in internal and external accounts, making the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks.
By 1987, political rivalries had weakened the government and halted further reform. After the general elections of 1989, the Janata Dal government adopted a populist approach and announced agricultural loan waivers, resulting in an additional ªscal burden of Rs 80 billion. Although the procurement prices of wheat and rice were raised twice, they were still less than the open-market prices. Fertilizer prices remained unchanged from 1981, and consequently the burden of the fertilizer subsidy stood at around Rs 4.4 billion (Jalan 1992) . Although the Ninth Finance Commission projected the national revenue deªcit to be Rs 8.5 billion for 1990-91 and 1991-92, the actual ªgures were twice as high, with inevitable increases in inºationary pressures (13 percent). These developments worsened the balance of payments deªcits (Government of India 1992). These macroeconomic imbalances were then further exacerbated by the Gulf crisis and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The Indian government responded vigorously with a program of stabilization and reform in mid-1991. The outcome was not only a signiªcant recovery, but also a new course for the country's economy.
India's manufacturing sector grew faster than the country's overall GDP in the last ªve decades of the 20th century (table 3) . There have been two distinct phases in manufacturing growth since 1993. Manufacturing GDP grew in real terms by 11 percent per year in 1993-97, but by only half this rate in [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . The decline in the growth rate of manufacturing output is also reºected in the reduction in the share of manufacturing in total GDP (17.25 percent in 1993 GDP (17.25 percent in -97, but 17.10 percent in 1997 GDP (17.25 percent in -2003 . It is this decline that has led to concerns about the role of manufacturing as an engine of India's economic growth. The evidence for improvement in manufacturing productivity in India is still mixed: for example, a study by Krishna and Mitra (1996) indicates that the manufacturing sector has enjoyed signiªcant productivity growth in the post-reform period, but Balakrishnan, Pushpangadan, and Babu (2000) claim that there is no evidence of such productivity growth.
The manufacturing sector in India
As a result of earlier plan strategies, India's public sector holds an important position in key manufacturing sectors such as steel, automobiles, petroleum, and engineering. The average share of public sector involvement in manufacturing was nearly the same in the 1990s as it was in the previous decade (table 4) . A distinction is often made in the Indian manufacturing sector between organized and unorganized sectors. Organized (registered) manufacturing consists of all factories requiring power on the premises that employ 10 or more workers and all factories that do not require power and employ 20 or more workers. Unorganized (unregistered) manufacturing consists of those enterprises with power that employ fewer than 10 workers and those not using power that employ fewer than 20 workers. The output share of the organized sector has continuously increased since 1950-51. Even in the 1990s, the output of the organized sector rose faster than the output of the unorganized sector (table 5) . However, in 1997 However, in -2001 , as reºected in the lower output share, the output of the organized sector increased at a slower rate than that of the unorganized sector. Is the organized sector more constrained than the unorganized sector in effecting the changes needed to sustain growth of output? Some analysts claim that labor policies have affected the organized sector more than the unorganized sector. Alternatively, it can be argued that expansion of capacity in the mid-1990s was far greater in the organized sector than in the unorganized sector, and hence the impact of excess capacity was also greater for the organized sector. Another suggestion is that the increased growth of the unorganized sector in recent years was a result of substantial increases in outsourcing by the organized sector (Ramaswamy 1999) . In our view, the increase in outsourcing activities was as much a response to the rigid labor policies that restrict a ªrm's ability to downsize the workforce as to increased demand.
The growth of the private manufacturing sector depends on proªtability, which has become an important issue since the mid-1990s. 1990s, the ratios of actual FDI to approvals have been about 20 percent. Between 1992 and 2000, approvals were given mainly in the priority industries, such as food and agro-processing, chemicals and chemical products, metallurgical industries, electrical machinery, and transport equipment. These ªve industries together attracted about 33 percent of FDI approvals (table 8) . To put it differently, only a small percentage of FDI ºows in the 1990s went into export-oriented industries; the bulk went into import-competing or nontraded industries such as power and fuel. India's experience has hence been different from that of several other developing countries, for which FDI has generally been central to the production of export-oriented industries. This is partly because of government policies that favor FDI in certain industries and partly because India has a large domestic market that attracts marketoriented FDI rather than efªciency-oriented and overseas-market-oriented FDI (Goldar 2002 ).
The structure of India's manufactured exports reveals the nature of the relationship between FDI and the manufacturing sector. Manufactured exports are mainly lowtechnology products concentrated in slow-growing market segments (Lall 1998 ) (table 9). India lacks a base in several high-technology products that are experiencing high growth in world trade, which might explain the country's relatively poor export performance. Neither the 1991 trade and industrial reforms nor the postreform FDI inºows have had any effect on India's export structure: table 9 shows that the composition of India's manufactured exports has not changed signiªcantly between the pre-and post-reform periods. The Herªndahl index (HI), which is deªned as the sum of the squares of the share of each commodity in total manufactured exports, can be used as a measure to verify this proposition. The lower limit of the HI is the reciprocal of the square of the number of manufacturing products exported, and the upper limit of the HI is 1. When the calculated value for HI is near the lower limit, it means that manufactured exports are signiªcantly diversiªed. When the calculated value is near the upper limit, this means that manufactured exports are concentrated in a few commodities. For the two-digit levels of classiªca- tion of 43 manufactured commodities, the lower limit for the HI is 0.00043. The calculated HIs for the years 1987-89 and 1997-99 are 0.086 and 0.081, respectively. Thus, there is no evidence of India's manufactured exports' becoming more diversiªed over time.
A study by Tendulkar (1999) shows that the growth rates for labor-intensive manufactured products in India during 1987-96 were relatively higher than the growth rates for skill-intensive products, but the reverse is true in the case of China. India's share in world exports of scale-intensive and differentiated products, which are technologically more sophisticated, was substantially lower than that of China in 1998 ( surplus), China has been diversifying into the production of differentiated and skillintensive products. The question is what prevents India from climbing up the technology ladder as well. The conclusion reached by Sachs and Warner (1995, 53) is that "open economies tend to adjust more rapidly from being primary-intensive to manufactures-intensive exporters. The difference in the speed of adjustment is statistically signiªcant. While many countries adopted the model of import protection as export promotion (of manufactures), it was the open economies that did best in promoting the export of manufactures." This analysis clearly supports the hypothesis that Indian manufacturing is still primarily geared toward domestic consumption. Therefore, its growth is limited by domestic demand.
Crucial factors inºuencing manufacturing productivity
In accounting for output growth, the conventional "residual" approach of Solow (1956) fails to recognize and estimate effectively the key role of technical change within the components of TFP growth. At any point in time, TFP is the combined result of technical progress and technical efªciency, or the efªciency with which factors are used, given the technology. From the perspective of long-run policy, it is crucial to distinguish the increment in productivity that occurs as a consequence of technical progress from the increment that results from improved technical efªciency in the application of already-established technologies. How does one account for the above distinctions in primal production function modeling?
If the production process were simply the engineering relationship between a set of inputs and observed output y t , then a well-deªned production function would describe the process accurately, and any variation in inputs would result in a corresponding change in output. In reality, however, observed output is often the result of a series of producers' decisions that inºuence the method of application of inputs. Thus the variables associated with the relevant production environment will also play an important part in an enterprise's decisions and consequently on its output. For this reason alone, some enterprises may be producing not on but inside their production frontiers, with a gap between "best-practice" techniques and "realized" methods of production. This gap may arise owing to the negative effects of nonprice or organizational factors (such as lack of adequate human capital) or to the impacts of insufªcient infrastructure, which are the result of the existing production environment emerging from the existing institutions. For example, lack of incentives, soft budget constraints of the central and state governments, inefªcient transmission of information about production processes to producers, and ineffective government control over enterprises could all cause deviations from best-practice production techniques. It is very difªcult to model the inºuence of these nonprice and organizational factors on output. Nevertheless, their combined inºuence can be introduced into the production function in several ways.
One method represents such nonprice and organizational variables in the model in an additive fashion, and the effects of changes in these variables on outputs are analyzed within the framework of the model. As Maddala (1977, 403) notes, however, this approach is unrealistic: "if economic agents are indeed maximizing, they would be taking these non-price and organizational variables into account in their decisions and thus the variables would be entering the model not in an additive fashion but as determinants of the parameters of the model." Therefore, a varyingparameters model or a varying-coefªcient model is appropriate in evaluating the effects of economic reforms and behavioral differences on outputs across manufacturing ªrms.
How does the estimation of a frontier production function with varying coefªcients differ from the estimation of a conventional production function? A production function is traditionally estimated as an average output response to a given level of inputs and technology, and it is theoretically deªned as the maximum possible output or potential output. The assumption in the conventional estimation of a ªrm's production function is that the "average" response is indeed the "maximum" possible with the given technology and that the difference between the estimated and realized outputs is the result of factors beyond the ªrm's control. In the estimation of a frontier production function with varying coefªcients, however, the difference between the estimated and realized outputs is considered to be attributable to factors both within and beyond the ªrm's control.
A general formulation of the Cobb-Douglas varying-coefªcients stochastic production frontier in terms of panel data is as follows:
where y it is the logarithm of output of the ith state in the tth period; x ijt is the logarithm of the jth input used by the ith state in the tth period when j 1 (an intercept is included in this model by considering j = 1); ␤ i1t is the intercept of the ith state in the tth period, and ␤ ijt , when j 1, is the slope coefªcient concerning the jth input used by the ith state in the tth period; and ⑀ is the disturbance term.
It can be seen from equation (1) that the output response coefªcients with respect to different inputs vary across manufacturing ªrms. It is rational to argue that the nonprice and organizational factors, which vary across ªrms, inºuence outputs indirectly through the method of application of inputs. When ªrms follow the best method of application of inputs (i.e., the method required by the selected technology to utilize the chosen inputs effectively), they obtain the maximum possible outputs for the given set of inputs, because the production response coefªcients will be the maximum, indicating that the ªrms are technically efªcient. As ªrms cannot produce more than the theoretically possible level of output, the above model is consistent with the production theory. If, because of the adverse effects of some nonprice or organizational factors (e.g., poor management decision making), manufacturing ªrms are not able to follow the best method of application of inputs, the output response coefªcients with respect to inputs will be at levels lower than the maximum that the ªrms would have obtained had they followed the best method of application of inputs. In this situation, ªrms are called technically inefªcient. Furthermore, any other ªrm-speciªc intrinsic characteristics that are not explicitly included, such as capacity utilization, may produce a combined contribution over and above the individual contributions. This "lump sum" contribution, if any, can be measured by the varying-intercept term.
The speciªcation of the above model implies that manufacturing ªrms are fully technically efªcient if and only if the chosen inputs are effectively utilized by following the best method of application. This means that nonprice, institutional, or organizational factors, which inºuence the method of application of inputs, do not exert any adverse effects on production. This can be interpreted as the reform policies' being able to eliminate the adverse effects that constrain ªrms from fully realizing their productive efªciency. On the other hand, if reform measures are not fully effective, ªrms would not be able to follow the best method of application of inputs, and so there would be a signiªcant gap between the ªrms' realized outputs and their maximum possible outputs. One advantage of this methodology is that it makes it possible to identify which applications of inputs are more inºuenced by differences in ªrm characteristics over time.
Equation (1) implies that production response coefªcients are speciªc to each individual manufacturing ªrm and to each time period for the same ªrm. Unfortunately, model (1) cannot be estimated, as the number of parameters to be estimated exceeds the number of observations. This necessitates imposing certain restrictions on the structure of (1). Drawing on Swamy (1971) , one method to reduce the number of parameters in equation (1) is to follow the analysis of variance (ANOVA) approach. This means imposing the following restrictions on equation (1):
where u ij and v jt denote cross-sectional and temporal variation, respectively, of the production coefªcients ␤ ijt . The above speciªcation is a more general case of the speciªcation discussed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) and so is not parsimonious. Alternatively, model (1) can be transformed into a random-coefªcients framework with the assumption that u ij and v jt are random variables. The randomcoefªcients speciªcation facilitates economizing on the number of parameters to be estimated but still allows the coefªcients to vary across individual decision-making units and over time. Drawing on the estimation procedures suggested by Grifªths (1972) , the individual response coefªcients can be estimated.
Following the above discussion about the method of application of inputs, the highest magnitude of each response coefªcient, and the intercept term from the production coefªcients of equation (1), constitutes the production coefªcients of the frontier function, providing the maximum possible output. To elaborate, let ␤ ␤ ␤ ␤ where ␤ jt * is the frontier coefªcient of the jth input in the tth period, and ␤ ijt is the coefªcient of the jth input of the ith manufacturing ªrm in the tth period.
In special cases of the production process in which constant returns to scale are imposed on the individual response coefªcients (␤ ijt ), the estimation of ␤ jt * is complicated and intractable. Even when the condition of constant returns to scale is imposed on the mean response coefªcients (␤ j ), then as a result of the relationship ␤ ␤
, the possibility that ͚␤ j * Ͼ 1 cannot be ruled out. In either case, the problem that remains is that the best-practice production outcome might not be feasible if all production processes had to have constant returns to scale by some strict technical rule. However, in the present study, the production frontier model can be viewed as a disequilibrium model of endogenous technological progress in which long-run growth is driven primarily by the accumulation of best-practice knowledge by ªrms. Therefore, drawing on the endogenous-growth models popularized by Romer (1986) , it is rational to argue that production as a function of the stock of knowledge of best-practice techniques and other inputs will exhibit increasing returns to scale. Why is this so? Following Arrow (1962) , it may be argued that increasing returns arise because a new (best-practice) technique is discovered as investment and production takes place. Therefore, ͚␤ j * Ͼ 1 does not pose any problem (theoretically) for the measurement of efªciency. Furthermore, the underlying assumption in our model is that all ªrms within an industry use more or less similar technology and have equal access to the best-practice techniques of the given technology. Because the above model facilitates measurement of the technical efªciency of ªrms, given their resources and technology, using a primal production frontier, cost minimization is not the concern here. Now the maximum possible frontier output for individual ªrms can be calculated as 
where y it is the logarithm of the observed output of the ith ªrm in the tth time period, and y it * is the logarithm of the estimated frontier output of the ith ªrm in the tth time period. A major advantage of the above methodology is that the analysis can be carried out even with cross-sectional data. Unlike in the conventional frontier approach, this method facilitates identiªcation of which ªrms are following the bestpractice technique of applying which inputs. It can easily be related to actual observations, which is obviously useful for policy analysis.
Following Kalirajan and Shand (1997) , ªgure 1 illustrates the decomposition of total output growth into input growth, technical progress, and technical-efªciency improvement. In periods 1 and 2, a ªrm faces production frontiers denoted by F 1 and F 2 , respectively. If a given ªrm has been technically efªcient, output would be y 1 * in period 1 and y 2 * in period 2. On the other hand, if the ªrm has been technically inefªcient and does not operate on its frontier because of ªrm-speciªc nonprice and organizational factors, then the ªrm's realized output is y 1 in period 1 and y 2 in period 2. Technical inefªciency is measured by the vertical distance between the frontier output and the realized output of a given ªrm, that is, TE 1 in period 1 and TE 2 in period 2, respectively. Hence, the change in technical efªciency (TE) over time is the difference between TE 2 and TE 1 . Now, suppose there is technical progress from improved quality of human and physical capital, so that a ªrm's potential frontier shifts to F 2 in period 2. If the given ªrm continues the technical progress, more output is produced from the same level of input. So, as shown in ªgure 1, the ªrm's output will be increased to y 1 * * for input x 1 . We measure technical progress as the distance between the two frontiers (y y 1 1 * * * − ), evaluated at x 1 . Denoting the contribution of input growth to output growth (between periods 1 and 2) as ⌬y x , the total output growth (y 2 Ϫ y 1 ) can be decomposed into three components: input growth, technological progress, and technical-efªciency change.
Referring to ªgure 1, the decomposition can be shown as This decomposition of total factor productivity growth into technical-efªciency improvement ("catching up") and technological advance is therefore useful in distinguishing between innovation or adoption of new technology by best-practice ªrms and the diffusion of new advanced technology that leads to improved technical efªciency among ªrms that are catching up. The coexistence of a high rate of technological progress and a low rate of change in technical efªciency may reºect failures in achieving technological mastery or effective diffusion of best technical practices.
It may also reºect high levels of technological dynamism in an industry with rapid obsolescence rates for technology. Such results have been reported for other countries, including China (Kalirajan, Obwona, and Zhao 1996) .
The production technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas varying-coefªcients function.
3 It is a rare phenomenon that the response in the dependent variable to a unit change in the independent variable is the same for all t ϭ 1, 2, . . . , T. Equal doses of labor and capital in a particular production process may yield different levels of output over different years, depending on technical progress and technicalefªciency improvement that might take place during the course of the sample period as a result of the varying inºuences of economic reforms. Drawing on Swamy and Mehta (1977) , the motivations for time-varying and cross-sectionally varying coefªcient models are (1) to allow for different coefªcients for each individual unit to account for spatial or interindividual heterogeneity and (2) to modify continually the values of coefªcients over time to allow the relationship to adapt itself to local conditions, such as industry-speciªc reforms. Therefore, using time-speciªc dummies (D) to account for interyear differences, we can express in logarithmic form the temporal ªrm-speciªc manufacturing production function as Y ϭ real value of manufactured output at 1981-82 constant prices for the concerned ªrm in the concerned industry using industry-speciªc wholesale price index deºators;
X 2 ϭ real gross capital stock measured in 1981-82 constant prices; 5 X 3 ϭ labor hours used in production at year end; 6 X 4 real value of material inputs used in production measured in 1981-82 constant prices. For given values of t, employing the speciªcations and estimation procedures described above, the mean and individual response production coefªcients were obtained. 8 For brevity, we present only the means of the estimated response coefªcients with standard errors and the ranges of the individual response 143 Asian Economic Papers
Manufacturing Sector Post-reform Performance in India 5 There is no universally accepted methodology for constructing a capital stock series. In the case of India, most of the recent studies on TFP growth have used the perpetual inventory method (PIM), which was ªrst introduced in empirical analysis by Goldsmith (1951) . In this method the capital stock of a given year is traced to the stream of past investments at constant prices. PIM requires an estimate of the capital stock for a benchmark year and estimates of investment in the subsequent periods. Let K 0 denote the real capital stock in the benchmark year and I t the real gross investment in ªxed capital in the tth year. Let r be the annual rate of discarding of assets. Then the real gross ªxed capital stock for the tth year is K t ϭ K 0 ϩ ⌺ I(t), where I(t) ϭ I t -rK tϪ1 . As the balance sheet ªgures for capital are at historic cost, such book value of capital has to be converted into asset value at replacement cost before the PIM can be followed. Following Balakrishna, Pushpangadan, and Babu (2000), but with a modiªcation of taking 1999-2000 as the base year, the value of capital at replacement cost for the base year is arrived at by revaluing the base year capital. As the approach is well documented in Balakrishna, Pushpangadan, and Babu (2000), it is not repeated here.
6 The PROWESS database provides data on total wages paid to all employees. In order to work out the labor man-days, the wage rate per man-day is constructed from the Annual Survey of Industries (CSO), with corresponding industrial classiªcation. Because of lack of data, labor days could not be divided into skilled and unskilled labor hours.
7 To work out the real value of material inputs, a material inputs price index with base 1981-82 was constructed by taking weights from the I-O Transaction Matrix 1989 -90 (CSO 1997 to combine the wholesale prices of the relevant inputs.
coefªcients for the frontier production functions (table 11 ). The range of the coefªcients clearly shows that the input-speciªc response coefªcients vary across ªrms. All of the core input coefªcients and the year dummy coefªcients are also signiªcant at the 5 percent level. The elasticity coefªcient estimates for ªxed capital and labor are lower than those for the material inputs. Combining these three estimates, we conclude that the selected manufacturing industries (chemical, electrical, and transport) have been operating more or less at constant returns to scale. From the year-wise estimates, frontier outputs for each period t were calculated using the frontier production coefªcients given in table 11. These frontier estimates show the maximum possible contribution of core inputs to output when the inputs are applied in accordance with the best-practice techniques of a given technology. Finally, sources of output growth in the later post-reform period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) were calculated as shown in equation (3) to examine the pattern of change in the manufacturing sector's productivity in the post-reform period.
A decomposition of output growth during a given period into contributions attributable to (1) input growth, (2) changes in efªciency, and (3) technical progress is based on the concept of the frontier output. The contribution of technical progress is the shift in the production frontier or potential output between any 2 years, and the contribution of input growth is the movement along a production function. The contribution of efªciency is the difference in output for the same level of input between the actual production function and the frontier production function in any one time period, and therefore the contribution of changes in efªciency is the difference between the contributions of efªciency during any two periods in question.
The results in table 12 imply that output growth in the three selected industries is mainly input-driven in the later post-reform period. Input growth, technicalefªciency change, and technical progress all contributed positively to output growth, but the contribution of input growth was largest. This result corroborates the ªnding of a recent national survey of manufacturing that claims that material cost and labor cost constitute about 75 percent of total production cost (Chandra and Sastry 2002) . The contribution of technical-efªciency change to output growth, however, indicates that technical efªciencies in the chemical products and electrical machinery industries have improved during 1999-2000. In contrast, technical efªciency in the transport industry appears to have been deteriorating since 1997. Generally, for the periods in question, technical efªciency improves when input growth is lower, and when input growth is higher, technical efªciency deteriorates. Although the efªciency changes have contributed to the decline in the output growth rate, the lower level of efªciency itself has meant lower levels of output, compared with potential output. The technical-efªciency estimates shown in ªgures 2-4 point to po-tential gains that would result from improved efªciency in the manufacturing sector. Improvements in the level of technical efªciency would be an important source of output growth. To put it differently, the mean technical-efªciency measures during 1997-2000 for the manufacturing industries of chemical products, electrical machinery, and transport equipment were around 0.85, 0.86, and 0.80, respectively. These ªgures imply that output supply can be increased by about 15 percent, 14 percent, and 20 percent in these respective industries, without having to increase any inputs, by following the best-practice technique of application for a given technology at the ªrm level.
Signiªcant gains in productivity could be achieved, particularly in ªrms with lower technical efªciencies, by raising the operation of the ªrm to be on its frontier. Obvi-
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Manufacturing Sector Post-reform Performance in India ously, not all ªrms can be put on their frontiers; however, if the factors associated with high technical inefªciencies can be determined, then improvements can be achieved through facilitating the effective functioning of those factors. Particularly relevant in this context are factors that would improve the competitiveness of manufacturing ªrms. Appropriate policy measures can be tailored and implemented to inºuence those factors to reduce the gaps between the most-efªcient and leastefªcient ªrms.
The 1991 economic reform in India opened up the country's economy to more foreign trade and investment. Though economists continue to argue about the nature of the relationship between productivity improvement and trade liberalization, the elements of stimulus to manufacturing growth resulting from economic reforms as a whole cannot be overlooked. For example, capital market reforms that encourage foreign-capital entry, when combined with tariff reductions, improved access to imported capital equipment and raw materials, and technical and ªnancial collaboration with foreign companies, would certainly boost manufacturing production and exports. The impact of such policy-inºuenced factors on competitiveness is examined by regressing the average ªrm-speciªc technical-efªciency measures over the period 1997-2000 separately for each of the three manufacturing sectors for the sam- export intensity, raw-material import intensity, technology import intensity, research and development (R&D) intensity, foreign collaboration, and advertising intensity in the following model speciªcation:
where x 1 ϭ export intensity, which indicates the ªrm's exposure to foreign output markets and is measured as the ratio of the ªrm's export to its sales value;
x 2 ϭ raw-material import intensity, which gauges the ªrm's degree of exposure to foreign input markets and is measured as the ratio of the value of imported raw materials to the total value of raw materials used;
x 3 ϭ technology import intensity, which represents the degree of use of advanced technology in production and is measured as a ratio of the ªrm's expenditure on imported technology to its total value of sales;
x 4 ϭ R&D intensity, which refers to the ªrm's effort to absorb and adapt new technology through research and training and is measured as a ratio of the ªrm's expenditure on R&D to the value of its sales;
x 5 ϭ advertising intensity, which is measured as the advertising-to-sales ratio for each ªrm and serves as a measure of product differentiation (Greer 1971) and also as an index of risk (Ornstein, Weston, and Intriligator 1973) ; D 1 ϭ foreign collaboration, which is deªned as a dummy variable taking a value of one if there is a foreign partner and zero otherwise, as determined using IMF rules, which treat a ªrm as a foreign direct investment enterprise if 10 percent of its stock is held abroad by a single investor.
The ordinary-least-squares estimates of equation (5) for the three industries are given in table 13. Several coefªcient estimates are statistically signiªcant at the 5 percent level or better, with theoretically acceptable signs and adjusted R 2 values that are reasonably high. The important result from this analysis is that the largest coefªcients for the selected industries are those of R&D, thus highlighting the importance of R&D, including training of workers, to improving ªrms' competitiveness. When ªrms increase their export intensity, they tend to improve their technical efªciencies, and the magnitude of the coefªcient of intensity is greater in the trans-port industries than in the electrical-machinery industries (table 13) . However, the coefªcient for export intensity is not signiªcant for the chemicals industry. The use of imported raw materials appears to increase technical efªciency in the transport industry more than it does in the chemical products industry. These results indicate that the transport industry will gain more technical efªciency and will improve its competitiveness through further trade liberalization. The coefªcient of intensity on imported raw materials is not signiªcant for the electrical-machinery industry.
The regression raises a few interesting questions. Is the electrical-machinery industry working with outdated technology? Has this industry been acquiring foreign technology effectively? Is the industry able to adapt the acquired foreign technology? The coefªcient of imported-technology intensity may provide some answers. This coefªcient is signiªcant for the transport industry, which conªrms our earlier conclusions about the link between efªciency improvement in this industry and trade liberalization. It is also signiªcant for the chemical products industry, although its magnitude is smaller than that for the transport industry. The importedtechnology intensity coefªcient is statistically signiªcant for the electrical-machinery industry, but very small. It may be conjectured that ªrms in the electrical-machinery industry may be slow in applying and adapting new technology because they lack appropriate means of training workers to use the new technology, a hypothesis that warrants further analysis. Kundu and Lalitha (1998) show that use of nonstandard tools and methods of production have locked a large number of Indian manufacturing ªrms into low-level quality equilibria. Their study also reveals that the extent of mechanization in these ªrms is still very low, although most ªrms understand that mechanization guarantees improvements in product quality and process times. In contrast, a number of Chinese manufacturing ªrms have implemented large-volume production systems such as ºow manufacturing systems and utilize efªcient assembly lines and globally acceptable equipment and tools of production (Nolan 2001) .
As expenditure on R&D increases, technical efªciency appears to increase substantially across all industries (table 13) . However, the impact of R&D is relatively more signiªcant for the transport industry than for the other two industries treated in the table. Chandra and Sastry (2002) , through two national surveys, show that within Indian manufacturing ªrms, the priority given to invention and R&D has been declining since 1997 as compared to the early 1990s. The implication has been that India's manufacturing products have lacked sophistication in terms of attracting and satisfying domestic and foreign customers. Lall (1998) argues that Indian manufacturing ªrms export relatively more low-technology products relative to hightechnology products because they lack sufªcient R&D and technical training programs for production workers. Though many Indian ªrms provide managerial training, only a few have computer-based decision support systems for helping their managers make effective decisions (Chandra and Sastry 2002) . Each large Chinese manufacturing enterprise, in contrast, has its own technology research center that helps it to move gradually from manual to automated manufacturing processes and provides appropriate technical training for workers (Nolan 2001 ).
As mentioned above, India's share in world exports in differentiated products is very small compared with that of China. One would expect a positive relationship between advertising intensity and technical efªciency in the selected industries. The advertising intensity coefªcients in table 13 appear to indicate that advertising increases technical efªciency more in the transport industry than in the electricalmachinery industry. For the chemical products industry, the advertising intensity coefªcient is positive, but it is not signiªcant. This result may be expected, because advertising may not help increase market power in chemical products that are greatly diversiªed. Furthermore, India's share in scale-intensive exports (of which chemical products constitute one group) is equal to that of China, but gems and precious stones constitute a major proportion of such exports.
Collaboration with a foreign partner in production tends to increase technical efªciency in all the selected industries, according to the table, which is expected as a result of the spillover of knowledge, technology, and market from the foreign collab-oration. The impact is relatively greater, as the table shows, for the transport industry than for the other two industries depicted.
The foregoing analysis reveals that Indian manufacturing ªrms are failing to focus on productivity and the factors that inºuence improvements in productivity. Is this lack of focus on productivity a result of ªrms' weakness in strategic decision making? Which core inputs are being wasted because of ineffective methods of application emanating from the unsharpened focus on productivity? Answers to these questions are necessary from the policy perspective.
The ªrm-speciªc technical-efªciency measures discussed above are not capable of identifying which inputs are applied more efªciently and which less so. As Kopp (1981, 491) has noted, technical-efficiency measures in a sense "treat the contribution of each factor to productive efªciency equally and thereby mask any differences in efªciency that might be attributed to particular factor inputs. For example, the parsimonious use of fuel and excessive use of capital can yield the same technical efªciency as the reverse pattern of factor use." The extension of the concept of technical efªciency to input-speciªc levels is then necessary, particularly if there is a priori knowledge about some inputs' being used more efªciently than others. For instance, the sharper decline in current price share than in constant price share may reºect an improvement in the productivity of India's manufacturing sector. Also, between 1995-96 and 1999-2000, India's total employment was higher but its manufacturing growth was lower than in the 1980s. This might suggest that labor may not only be inefªciently utilized but also underutilized, relative to capital and material inputs, within certain ªrms in the selected industries in the later post-reform period. Extension of the ªrm-speciªc technical efªciency analysis into a ªrm-and inputspeciªc technical-efªciency analysis will allow these propositions to be tested.
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Following the earlier discussion concerning equation (4), technical efªciency in the use of a given input (say, input 2) can be deªned as
Where IEFF jt 2 is the technical efªciency of the jth producer with respect to input 2 at the tth period and ␤ ␤ 2 2 t j t * max ( ), = j ϭ 1 to n, is the coefªcient of the most efªcient producer with respect to the use of input 2 at the tth period. We term efªciencies with respect to the use of speciªc inputs as "embodied" or "input-speciªc" efªci-encies, and the efªciency implied by variations in the intercept (MEFF j ϭ ␤ ␤ 0 0 jt t / * ) is termed "disembodied efªciency." Embodied efªciency refers to efªciency arising from following the best-practice production technique of applying speciªc inputs. Disembodied efªciency refers to efªciency that is independent of any inputs appearing in the production function. For example, in crop production, embodied efªci-ency is speciªc to the use of fertilizer and irrigation (two key inputs), whereas disembodied efªciency is a more general concept that may reºect capacity utilization, organization, or efªciencies of combining these inputs. The terminology is similar to that used in the case of technical progress in economics literature.
Firm-and input-speciªc technical-efªciency measures for the three previously discussed industries for the sample period have been calculated using equation (6). The statistics are presented in tables 14-16. Generally, the results in these tables do not show any clear pattern that suggests an answer to the question of which inputs are efªciently used by which industry and in which time period. However, one conclusion is clear: across the selected industries, labor, capital, and materials inputs have not been used fully effectively. This situation is alarming because (as noted above) output growth has been input-driven in the period of analysis, but here the analysis reveals that inputs are being used ineffectively. How does one promote the effective use of core inputs? The reform measures implemented to date have inºuenced the growth of the manufacturing sector through the liberalization of capital markets and foreign-exchange markets, the elimination of government controls on capacity creation, and the promotion of exports. However, our ªrm-level analysis shows that manufacturing output on average could be increased by about 15 percent without having to increase inputs, even with the favorable production environment created by these reforms. The analysis also identiªes that the 15 percent increase should come through improving the method of application of capital, labor, and materials inputs. It would no doubt be logical to argue that capital and materials inputs might have been more inºuenced by the reform measures so far undertaken than labor inputs have been, because none of the reforms directly addressed labor-related issues. If this were the case, it would be rational to expect that at least capital and materials inputs have been used effectively, compared with labor inputs since the reforms, but our analysis does not conªrm this expectation. The policy implication is that any measures aimed at reducing technical inefªciency should be directed mainly at ªrms' managers and decision makers. Until proper managerial and strategic decisions are undertaken at the ªrm level, the beneªts of the existing reforms cannot be fully realized. 
Conclusions
Manufacturing was an engine of growth in India in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the 1991 economic reform, it appears that the speed of the engine has slowed down. Whereas China has consolidated its position as one of the leading manufacturing countries within a short period after the implementation of economic reforms, the experience of Indian manufacturing has been different. Our analysis reveals that unlike the Chinese case, India's manufacturing output growth in the post-reform period has been input-driven rather than efªciency-or technology-driven. On average, an increase in output of about 15 percent can be achieved by improving ªrms' efªciency through following best-practice techniques, without having to increase any inputs or improve the existing technology. Improving efªciency in the production process requires improvement in strategic decision making at the ªrm level. The national survey of manufacturing industries reported by Chandra and Sastry (2002) indicates that although Indian ªrms understand the importance of R&D in improving efªciency and competitiveness, they seem unable to make the necessary changes. Policy measures should encourage ªrms to invest more in R&D, implement technical training programs for workers, and provide managers with more computer-aided design and decision-making tools.
Identifying the exact policy measures that should be implemented is beyond the scope of this paper; however, some broad suggestions can be made. Militant actions and demands by labor unions have been on the decline in India, which may mean that management of human resources can be more ºexible; nevertheless, it may be necessary to implement labor reforms, particularly with respect to hiring and ªring, to help ªrms improve the production skills of manufacturing workers and thereby improve competitiveness. Also, further opening up of the economy through more trade reforms, such as bringing the tariff structure in line with that of the Asian Tigers, would add more fuel to the engine of growth. India's excise duties and sales taxes on food products are currently very high relative to those of several comparable countries.
We do not deny that the reforms undertaken so far have improved the openness of the Indian economy and have facilitated India's integration with the global economy to some extent. Our study indicates that signiªcant potential growth still remains unrealized in the manufacturing sector, mainly because of a failure to invest in R&D and upgrade old technology. Experiences from East Asian and Southeast Asian economies show that aggressive canvasing by public and private enterprises to generate technical collaboration and FDI from big overseas enterprises, using facilities provided by the central and state governments (such as special economic zones), appears to be an effective way to boost manufacturing exports. As the liberalized rules for FDI in manufacturing have already been in place, the onus for attracting FDI mainly lies with domestic entrepreneurs.
